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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are law professors at Boston
University School of Law and the University of New
Mexico School of Law.2 Based on their expertise in
antidiscrimination law, constitutional law, and
racism in the United States, amici believe their
knowledge and collective experiences can inform this
Court’s consideration of the pending matter.
Jonathan Feingold is an associate professor of
law. He earned his J.D. from the University of
California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) School of Law with
a Specialization in Critical Race Studies and received
his B.A. from Vassar College. Before joining Boston
University School of Law, Professor Feingold clerked
for federal judges in the Second Circuit and Central
District of California and served as a special assistant
to UCLA’s inaugural Vice Chancellor for equity,
diversity and inclusion.
Professor Feingold has written multiple law
review articles that analyze Petitioner’s claims
against Respondents. That work has interrogated
institutional dynamics that disincentivize elite
universities from marshaling the most compelling
arguments for race-conscious admissions policies
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.3(a), all parties have provided
blanket consent to the filing of amicus briefs. Pursuant to
Rule 37.6, Amici affirm that no counsel for a party authored this
brief in whole or in part, and no such counsel or party made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief. No persons other than amici, or their
counsel, made a monetary contribution to its preparation or
submission.
2 The views expressed by amici in this brief are their own and
should not be construed as views of Boston University School of
Law or the University of New Mexico School of Law.
1
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(“RCAPs”3). Professor Feingold has detailed how
Respondents, like prior university defendants, have
failed to foreground available facts and theories that
would buttress their own policies against normative
and doctrinal attacks. Amici are concerned that
absent additional briefing, this Court might
adjudicate Petitioner’s claims on a deficient record
that understates the legal and moral case for RCAPs.
Vinay Harpalani is Professor of Law and the
Lee and Leon Karelitz Chair in Evidence and
Procedure at the University of New Mexico School of
Law. He is a South Asian American male who was
raised in New Castle County, Delaware, where he
attended schools that implemented comprehensive
school desegregation under federal court order. He
earned his J.D. from New York University School of
Law; his Ph.D. in Education from the University of
Pennsylvania; and his bachelor’s degrees from the
University of Delaware.
Professor Harpalani has written several law
review articles that analyze the doctrinal contours of
RCAPs, such as diversity’s importance within racial
groups for strict scrutiny’s compelling interest and
narrow tailoring prongs. He has also written
extensively on Asian Americans’ positioning in
educational debates, focusing on the role of racial
stereotypes in framing those debates.
Against this backdrop, amici respectfully
request that this Court:

For purposes of this brief, the terms “race-conscious admissions
policies” and “RCAPs” are used interchangeably to refer to
policies that permit decisionmakers to consider the racial
identity of individual applicants.
3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4179822

3
(1) resist Petitioner’s attempt to conflate two
discrete claims it levies against Harvard: (a) an
intentional discrimination (or “negative action”) claim
that alleges Harvard discriminates against Asian
Americans to the benefit of white applicants; and (b) a
generic affirmative action challenge. Petitioner blurs
these claims to scapegoat and stigmatize affirmative
action, which is not the source of negative action and
benefits many Asian Americans.
(2) credit the multiple ways that Respondents’
RCAPs mitigate unearned racial advantages that
white applicants enjoy in Respondents’ admissions
processes. Respondents’ RCAPs serve a critical
antidiscrimination function that ensures a more “fair
appraisal of each individual’s academic promise” and
therefore constitute “no ‘preference’ at all.” Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
306 n.43 (1978) (Powell, J.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
“No one is under the illusion that we live in a
postracial society, or that racial discrimination is a
thing of the past.” Pet’r’s Br. 49. Petitioner tells it all.
Nearly 70 years after Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), students of color still face racial
discrimination throughout their academic lives. And
yet, Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit universities
from accounting for this reality—a result that would
constitutionalize racial advantages for white
applicants.
The Court should reject this request.
All lower courts to adjudicate Petitioner’s
claims have reached the same conclusion:
Respondents employ RCAPs consistent with the
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Constitution and federal antidiscrimination law. This
should not be a surprise. Petitioner has neither facts
nor law on its side. But that is a feature of this
litigation, not a bug. Petitioner wants to change the
law, not to prevail under this Court’s existing
affirmative action jurisprudence.
Specifically, Petitioner asks this Court to
declare that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibit public and private universities,
respectively, from ever considering an applicant’s
race. Petitioner would ban all RCAPs—even those
that, as here, promote a more “meritocratic” and
individualized process by countering racial
advantages that flow to white applicants.
Amici respectfully request that this Court deny
Petitioner’s request, which would pervert the
Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning, Title VI’s
core purpose, and Brown’s animating spirit and moral
mandate.
Amici seek to highlight two broad issues.
First, Petitioner brings two discrete claims
against Harvard: (1) an intentional discrimination (or
“negative action”) claim alleging anti-Asian bias that
benefits white applicants and (2) a standard
affirmative action challenge. It is critical that this
Court disentangle the allegations that underlie, and
the precedent that governs, these distinct claims.
Petitioner has blurred these claims to
scapegoat and stigmatize affirmative action as a
practice that pits Asian Americans against other
students of color. Yet Petitioner belies its own
narrative. According to Petitioner’s own expert, anti-
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Asian bias—to the extent it exists—benefits wealthy
white applicants, not students of color.
Second, Respondents’ RCAPs counter racial
advantages that white applicants enjoy in
purportedly
“colorblind”
components of the
admissions process. Respondents’ RCAPs, in turn, are
best characterized as essential antidiscrimination
that promote the “fair appraisal of each individual’s
academic promise” and constitute “no ‘preference’ at
all.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43 (1978). By countering
unearned racial advantages that benefit white
applicants,
Respondents
realize
a
more
individualized and “meritocratic” process that helps
to desegregate and diversify their campuses.
Respondents’ RCAPs clearly satisfy strict
scrutiny. But this backdrop also troubles the
conclusion that strict scrutiny should apply to all
“racial classifications.” As this case highlights, this
standard views with suspicion race-conscious
practices that counter discrimination in the present—
and thereby hinders universities from realizing
Brown’s fundamental aspiration of an American
where race no longer matters. In effect, this standard
ignores the unavoidable reality that “to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race.” Id. at 407
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Petitioner acknowledges
that racism exists. But urges this Court to ignore that
reality and cripple Respondents’ ability to overcome
it.
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court
should affirm the judgments below.
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ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER’S
NEGATIVE
ACTION
CLAIM
SUPPORTS
MORE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, NOT LESS.

Petitioner’s lawsuit against Harvard contains
two distinct claims. See Harv.JA357-58. The first is
an intentional discrimination claim. Harv.JA470-74.
We term this Petitioner’s negative action claim
because the alleged anti-Asian bias benefits similarly
situated white applicants.4 The second claim is a
standard affirmative action challenge targeting
Harvard’s RCAP. See Harv.JA474-77. To properly
adjudicate this case, it is critical that this Court
disentangle these two claims, which differ in four key
respects.
First, the claims target distinct components of
Harvard’s admissions process. The negative action
claim targets facially race-neutral considerations.
The affirmative action challenge targets Harvard’s
open consideration of race.
Second, the alleged negative action against
Asian Americans benefits white applicants. Harvard’s
RCAP, in contrast, primarily benefits students of
color—including many Asian Americans.
Third, the claims are governed by distinct lines
of precedent. The negative action claim—because it
Law Professor Jerry Kang coined the term negative action to
describe admissions processes that grant preferential treatment
to white applicants over similarly situated Asian American
applicants. See Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian
Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin’s Defense of
Affirmative Action, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1996). We
adopt this terminology because it best reflects the allegations
that underlie Petitioner’s intentional discrimination claim.
4
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challenges facially race-neutral conduct—is governed
by Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (and its
progeny) and related Title VI precedent. The
affirmative action challenge is governed by this
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence embodied by
Bakke, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 579 U.S. 365 (2016).
Fourth, the claims invite different remedies.
Notably, the negative action claim, if proven, would
call for remedies that ameliorate the anti-Asian
biases that unfairly benefit white applicants. This
includes more affirmative action, not less. The
affirmative action claim, if successful, could entail the
loss of Harvard’s RCAP—a result that would: (a) fail
to remedy anti-Asian Bias, (b) harm applicants of
color (including Asian Americans), (c) amplify the
racial advantages white applicants already enjoy; and
(d) thereby render Harvard’s admissions process less
“meritocratic.”
A. Petitioner claims that “colorblind”
components of Harvard’s admissions
process harm Asian Americans to the
benefit of white applicants.
Petitioner claims that Harvard discriminates
against Asian Americans in favor of white applicants.
Critically, Petitioner concedes that this claim does not
implicate Harvard’s RCAP. See Pet’r’s Br. 72-74. To
the contrary, Petitioner attributes negative action to
multiple facially race-neutral components of
Harvard’s admissions process.
This includes “Legacy+” preferences, which
Harvard extends to (a) children of alumni,
(b) recruited athletes, (c) dean’s list members, and
(d) children of faculty and staff. See infra Section
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II.B.1. Petitioner highlights, for example, that an
Office of Civil Rights investigation attributed
disparate “admissions rates between whites and
Asian Americans … [to] Harvard’s legacy and athlete
preferences,
which
largely
benefited
white
applicants.” Pet’r’s Br. at 27.
Petitioner also contends that Asian Americans
are subject to racial stereotyping and unequal
treatment vis-à-vis white applicants in Harvard’s
“personal” rating. See id. at 2, 28 (“[Harvard]
penalizes [Asian American applicants] for supposedly
lacking as much leadership, confidence, likability, or
kindness as white applicants.”); see also id. at 25-27.
The personal rating summarizes an applicant’s
personal qualities based on an “applicant’s essays,
their responses to short-answer questions, teachers’
and guidance counselors’ qualitative observations
about applicants, alumni interviewers’ comments,
and much other information.” Harv.Dist.Ct.Dkt. 418
at 43. Admission officers further assign the personal
rating based on their assessment of a variety of other
factors, including the applicant’s “humor, sensitivity,
grit, leadership, integrity, helpfulness, courage,
kindness and many other qualities.” Students for Fair
Admission, Inc., v. President and Fellows of Harvard
Coll., 346 F. Supp. 3d 174, 183 (D. Mass. 2018).
It is plausible that pervasive and pernicious
stereotypes about Asian Americans and other groups
of color infiltrate subjective assessments like
Harvard’s personal rating. See infra Section II.B.2.a;
see also Vinay Harpalani, Asian Americans, Racial
Stereotypes, and Elite University Admissions, 102
B.U. L. Rev. 233, 267-73 (2022). But for purposes of
Petitioner’s negative action claim, the key insights
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are that: (1) Petitioner alleges that “colorblind”
components of Harvard’s admissions process harm
Asian Americans (2) to the benefit of white applicants.
Even the district court noted that “the disparity
between white and Asian American applicants’
personal ratings has not been fully and satisfactorily
explained[,]” perhaps due to biases in teacher and
counselor recommendations or to Harvard’s
admissions reviewers’ implicit biases. Students for
Fair Admission, Inc., v. President and Fellows of
Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 171 (D. Mass.
2019) [hereinafter SFFA v. Harvard I].
The foregoing confirms that Harvard’s RCAP is
not responsible for negative action against Asian
Americans. Petitioner actually concedes this point.
Beyond locating anti-Asian bias in “colorblind”
components of the admissions process, Petitioner
emphasizes the myriad ways that negative action
benefits white applicants.
In Petitioner’s own words: “Incontrovertible
evidence shows that Harvard’s admissions policy has
a disproportionately negative impact on Asian
Americans vis-a-vis similarly situated white
applicants that cannot be explained on nondiscriminatory grounds.” Harv. Dist.Ct.Dkt. 413 at 1
(emphasis added) [hereinafter “Plaintiff’s MSJ”]; see
also, e.g., Pet’r’s Br. 30 (“Harvard admits Asian
Americans at similar or lower rates than whites, even
though Asian Americans receive higher academic
scores, higher extracurricular scores, and higher
alumni-interview scores.”); Plaintiff’s MSJ at 10
(“Looking at the number of Asian Americans denied
admission because of the bias against them
underscores the magnitude of the penalty. If they had
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been treated like white applicants, an average of
approximately 44 more Asian Americans per year
would have been admitted to Harvard over the sixyear period the experts analyzed.”).
To summarize, the alleged negative action
harms Asian Americans to the benefit of less qualified
white applicants. In stark contrast, Harvard’s RCAP
levels the playing field by countering racial
advantages that benefit white applicants to the
detriment of more qualified students of color—
including Asian Americans. See infra Part II.B.
B. Petitioner’s two claims are governed
by distinct lines of precedent and
require distinct evidentiary showings.
The First Circuit suggested that “SFFA’s
intentional discrimination claim does not fit neatly
into the strict scrutiny framework.” Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard
Coll., 980 F.3d 157, 195 n.34 (1st Cir. 2020), cert.
granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) [hereinafter SFFA v.
Harvard II]. The First Circuit should have been more
direct.
Under
this
Court’s
well-established
antidiscrimination caselaw, strict scrutiny is
inapplicable to Petitioner’s negative action claim.
This is because, as noted above, the alleged negative
action derives from facially race-neutral conduct.
Accordingly, this claim is governed by precedent that
governs any other discrimination claim challenging
facially race-neutral conduct with a racially disparate
impact.
As a matter of constitutional law, this triggers
the trilogy of Washington v. Davis, Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), and Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
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U.S. 256 (1979). Under this line of caselaw, a
plaintiff’s prima facie case requires proof of
discriminatory intent. See Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 265 (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.”). This Court has adopted similar
standards to govern Title VI claims, which also
require proof of discriminatory intent when a party
challenges facially race-neutral conduct.5 See
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001)
(“What we said in Alexander v. Choate … is true
today: ‘Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances
of intentional discrimination.’”).
Petitioner recognizes that the foregoing
standard governs its negative action claim. This is
evident from Petitioner’s briefing, which argues that
discriminatory intent could be inferred through the
“cumulative” evidence before the court—evidence
that includes statistical analysis, “highly subjective”
facially race-neutral components of Harvard’s
admissions process, and off-hand remarks that track
Asian stereotypes. See Pet’r’s Br. 72-73.
Nonetheless, Petitioner contends that strict
scrutiny should apply to its negative action claim. See
id. at 71-72. According to Petitioner, Harvard should
bear the initial burden because (a) Harvard’s
admissions process also contains a race-conscious
component and (b) Petitioner challenges both

Title VI’s implementing regulations contain a distinct
disparate impact provision that independently supports
Harvard’s RCAP. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000); Kimberly
West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black
Bonus, 64 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 592 (2017).
5
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Harvard’s RCAP and facially race-neutral conduct in
the same action.
Such a rule would produce perverse
incentivizes. Any time a litigant wants to challenge
facially race-neutral conduct that would ordinarily
trigger Washington v. Davis (or related Title VI
precedent), the claim would jump to a separate
doctrinal track if the defendant also employs, and the
plaintiff also challenges, some race-conscious
practice. Pursuant to this theory, Harvard’s Legacy+
preferences are also subject to strict scrutiny—
notwithstanding that they are facially race-neutral.
But were Harvard to eliminate its RCAP, that same
claim challenging Legacy+ preferences would jump
back to the Washington v. Davis track.
The foregoing is perhaps most revealing
because it exposes Petitioner’s true motives. Were
Petitioner invested in remedying negative action
against Asian Americans, Legacy+ preferences would
be its primary target. As described below, see infra
Section II.B.1, Legacy+ preferences function as
substantial race/class bonuses for underqualified
wealthy white applicants. This preferential treatment
occurs at the direct expense of innocent and
accomplished students of color—including many
Asian Americans. But Petitioner shows little interest
in challenging this naked departure from merit.
To the contrary, the doctrinal gymnastics
Petitioner invites appear designed to serve two
related purposes: (a) leverage a narrative of antiAsian bias to undercut the legal and moral case for
RCAPs—even though affirmative action is not the
source of negative action (and, in fact, could remedy
it), and (b) usher in a new era of antidiscrimination
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law that views with skepticism any policy change that
diminishes the expected over-representation white
students enjoy in most elite institutions. See Vinay
Harpalani, Testing the Limits: Asian Americans and
the Debate over Standardized Entrance Exams, 73
S.C. L. Rev. 759, 786-87 (2022).
C. Petitioner requests relief that
not redress negative action,
harm Asian Americans, and
amplify racial advantages for
applicants.

would
would
would
white

Many civil rights advocates would welcome a
ruling that breathes life into this Court’s disparate
impact jurisprudence. But if the Court does so here, it
should ensure the remedy redresses the harm. That
is, a proper remedy for negative action should target
the source of alleged anti-Asian discrimination. This
could entail at least two standard civil rights
remedies: (1) eliminate or alter6 “colorblind”
considerations that unfairly benefit wealthy white
applicants to the detriment of innocent Asian
Americans; and/or (2) buttress Harvard’s existing
RCAP to better mitigate racial preferences that
benefit wealthy white applicants.
Both remedies would promote the equality
rights of Asian American applicants. See Jonathan P.
Feingold, SFFA v. Harvard: How Affirmative Action
Alterations could include: (a) reducing the weight given to a
particular consideration, (b) adopting new facially neutral
considerations less vulnerable to bias; or (c) targeted racial
cloaking that hides an applicant’s racial identity in specific
moments of the review process. See Jonathan P. Feingold, SFFA
v. Harvard: How Affirmative Action Myths Mask White Privilege,
107 Calif. L. Rev. 707, 732 (2019).
6
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Myths Mask White Privilege, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 707,
728-31 (2019). Petitioner seeks neither. To the
contrary, Petitioner requests only that this Court
prohibit all consideration of race in the admissions
process. See Harv.JA490-91; see also Pet’r’s Br. 69
(opining that “[m]ost universities can keep their
admissions systems exactly as they are—with
holistic, individualized review that considers all
legitimate factors—only they cannot use race itself as
a factor.” (brackets and quotation marks omitted)).
Such a ruling would cast aside decades of this
Court’s well-reasoned precedent and invert Brown’s
animating spirit and legal mandate. And notably, this
remedy would leave untouched the source of negative
action. Why? Because it does not target the
“colorblind” components of Harvard’s admissions
process that harm Asian Americans to the benefit of
less qualified white applicants. In fact, eliminating
affirmative action would doubly harm Asian
Americans. Not only would such a ruling fail to
address allegations of negative action, but it would
remove the piece of Harvard’s admissions process best
suited to counter preferential treatment for white
applicants.
D. Petitioner
blurs
its
claims
stigmatize affirmative action.

to

Petitioner brings two distinct claims. Yet
throughout this litigation, Petitioner has blurred the
facts that underlie, and the doctrine that governs,
those claims. Given Petitioner’s open interest in
eliminating affirmative action, the purpose appears
clear.
Petitioner’s negative action claim is not
designed to remedy anti-Asian bias or reduce racial
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advantages that white applicants continue to enjoy.
Rather, Petitioner marshals allegations of anti-Asian
bias (alongside Harvard’s history of antisemitism) to
stigmatize affirmative action before this Court and
the court of public opinion.
The requested remedies underscore that this
case was never about realizing Brown’s promise. To
the contrary, Petitioner aims to prohibit all public and
private universities from considering applicant race—
even when RCAPs offer a modest tool to reduce racial
preferences for white applicants, promote the present
and personal equality interests of students of color
(including Asian American applicants), and diversify
and desegregate historically white institutions.
Petitioner’s requested remedy embodies a perverse
tribute to Brown.
II.

RCAPS ARE NECESSARY TO COUNTER
RACIAL
ADVANTAGES
WHITE
APPLICANTS ENJOY IN HARVARD AND
UNC’S ADMISSIONS PROCESSES.

Petitioner asks this Court to overturn its own
well-reasoned conclusion that diversity constitutes a
compelling interest sufficient to justify narrowly
tailored RCAPs. This Court should reject this
invitation. But this Court need not even reach this
issue—because Harvard and UNC’s RCAPs are
lawful for a reason independent of their impact on
student body diversity.
By considering race, Respondents counter
unearned
racial
advantages
that
benefit
(predominately
wealthy)
white
applicants.
Respondents’ RCAPs, in turn, constitute modest
antidiscrimination measures that reduce race’s
impact on admissions, promote a more objective
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process, and protect students’ of color right to compete
on their individual “merit,” irrespective of their race.
See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)
(Thomas, J.) (identifying a constitutional injury when
“the government erects a barrier that makes it more
difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit
than it is for members of another group.”). And in so
doing, RCAPs enable historically white institutions to
desegregate and diversify their campuses.
It is hard to imagine a more compelling
admissions design. Moreover, once one credits
RCAPs’ antidiscrimination function, it does more
than reinforce their constitutional mooring and moral
authority. This insight also exposes an enduring
contradiction inherent in this Court’s affirmative
action jurisprudence: its conclusion that strict
scrutiny should apply to all “racial classifications,”
even those that—as here—counter racial advantages
for
white
applicants,
promote
individual
“meritocracy,” and diversify and desegregate
historically white institutions.
A. Justice Powell acknowledged that
RCAPs could promote “meritocracy”
and constitute “no ‘preference’ at all.”
In Bakke, five Justices rejected a series of
justifications U.C. Davis had offered to defend its
RCAP. See 438 U.S. at 315. In his controlling opinion,
Justice Powell endorsed student body diversity as a
compelling interest. Id. But diversity was not the only
compelling interest Justice Powell identified. In an
oft-overlooked footnote, Justice Powell offered the
following observation:
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Racial classifications in admissions
conceivably could serve a fifth purpose,
one which petitioner does not articulate:
fair appraisal of each individual’s
academic promise in light of some
cultural bias in grading or testing
procedures. To the extent that race and
ethnic background were considered only
to the extent of curing established
inaccuracies in predicting academic
performance, it might be argued that
there is no “preference” at all.
Id. at 306 n.43 (emphasis added).
Justice Powell buried this insight because U.C.
Davis never justified its RCAP on this basis. See
Jonathan P. Feingold, Ambivalent Advocates: Why
Elite Universities Compromised the Case for
Affirmative Action, 58 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2022). As then, Harvard and UNC have
not defended their RCAPs as antidiscrimination that
reduces white racial advantages—even with half-acentury of empirical scholarship that confirms Justice
Powell’s intuition. See infra Section II.B.
Respondents’ oversight compromises the case for
their own policies. It also obscures how white
students continue to benefit from common measures
of “merit” that systematically understate the existing
academic talent and potential of students of color.
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B. “Colorblind”
components
of
Respondents’ admissions processes
reward and reproduce white racial
advantages.
Justice Powell did not characterize RCAPs in
such terms, but he surfaced the antidiscrimination
function RCAPs often perform. His insight also
troubles the ease with which Petitioners and this
Court characterize RCAPs as “racial preferences.”
This preference framing misdescribes affirmative
action and trades on pernicious anti-Black
stereotypes. See Cheryl I. Harris, Fisher’s Foibles:
From Race and Class to Class not Race, UCLA L. Rev.
Discourse (2017). It also obscures the substantial
racial advantages Respondents confer to (often
wealthy)
white
applicants
via
“colorblind”
considerations—even with affirmative action in place.
RCAPs remain necessary to mitigate those white
racial preferences. As Justice Powell envisioned, this
modest intervention promotes the “fair appraisal of
each individual’s academic promise” and constitutes
“no ‘preference’ at all.”
1.
Legacy+
Preferences
confer
“race/class preferences” to wealthy
white applicants.
Harvard awards Legacy+ preferences to
applicants who fall into four categories: children of
alumni (“legacies”), recruited athletes, dean’s list
members, and children of staff or faculty. See Peter
Arcidiacono et al., Legacy and Athlete Preferences at
Harvard, 40 J. Lab. & Econ. 133, 134 (2021)
(analyzing applicant data from students who would
have graduated in 2014-2019). Legacy+ preferences
are race-neutral in form; they do not expressly
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differentiate between applicants based on race. But in
practice, Legacy+ preferences comprise a substantial
race and class preference for wealthy white
applicants. See id. at 135 n.5 (“[W]hites … make up
the vast majority of ALDC applicants and admits.”).
Overall, white applicants comprise 40% of nonLegacy+ applicants but nearly 70% of Legacy+
applicants.7 Id. at 148, tbl.4. This includes recruited
athletes, 75% of whom are white and tend to be
wealthy. Id.; see also id. at 142 (“Recruited athletes at
Harvard tend to be [economically] advantaged and
disproportionately white in part because of the
varsity sports Harvard offers, including fencing,
sailing, and skiing.”).
Beyond their over-representation among
applicants, white Legacy+ students are also overrepresented on Harvard’s campus. Over a recent sixyear period, nearly 2,200 (out of 4,993 total) of
Harvard’s white admits were Legacy+. Id. at 148,
tbl.4. This total exceeded all of Harvard’s Black
(1,392) and Latinx (1,283) admits, and nearly equaled
Harvard’s Asian American (2,443) admits. Id.; see
also id. at 153 (observing that 43% of Harvard’s white
admits are Legacy+ but only 16% of Harvard’s Black,
Latinx, and Asian American admits are Legacy+).
One might assume that white Legacy+ admits
are substantially overrepresented because they
possess superior academic credentials. That is
incorrect. According to Petitioner’s expert, “roughly
three-quarters of white [Legacy+] admits would have
been rejected absent their [Legacy+] status.” Id. at
133.
The 70% figure refers to recruited athletes, legacies, and dean’s
list applicants. See id. at 135.
7
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In raw terms, this means that Harvard
admitted 1,634 white (and predominately wealthy)
students with academic credentials inferior to the
typical applicant. Id. at 148, tbl.4. If this number feels
large, it should. In relative terms, 33% of Harvard’s
white admits and 16% of all admitted students
accessed Harvard because of their inherited race/class
privilege, not academic merit. To add insult to injury,
this number exceeds all Black and Latinx admits
from the same period—even when Harvard employs
an RCAP that counters some white racial advantage.
Id.
According to Petitioner’s expert, this race/class
bonus is “particularly striking” for white recruited
athletes:
At most, 28% of white athlete admits
receive a 2 or higher on the academic
rating. In contrast, 89% of white typical
admits receive a 2 or higher on the
academic rating. In many cases—and in
contrast to LDC admits—recruited
athlete admits are substantially weaker
than typical applicants. Id. at 141
(emphasis in original).
In practice if not name, Harvard’s Legacy+
preferences reward less qualified white applicants for
their inherited race and class privilege. Put
differently, “[t]he majority of [whites] are admitted to
[Harvard] because of discrimination, and because of
this policy all are tarred as undeserving.” Grutter, 539
U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring). Petitioner’s
expert even acknowledges that these students enjoy a
double bonus. See Arcidiacono et al., supra, at 141
(“The patterns described above suggest that
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[Harvard’s]
LDC
applicants … are
doubly
advantaged.…”).
First, Legacy+ applicants are rewarded for
enjoying a status (e.g., child of alumni) unrelated to
any standard conception of academic “merit.”
Second, well before they apply, that status
confers multiple advantages. Most Legacy+
applicants are white and wealthy—thereby enjoying
unique access to the social, economic, and political
resources necessary to refine the application
components Harvard most values.
But characterizing Legacy+ preferences as a
double bonus understates the race/class advantage it
confers. This is more accurately described as a triple
bonus. Harvard admits Legacy+ applicants even when
their academic profile is weaker than their less
advantaged peers. Id. at 142 (“[T]he average
[Legacy+] admit is weaker than the typical admit.”).
Thus, Harvard rewards wealthy white applicants who
do less with more. Id. at 144 (“[W]hite LDC applicants
in the bottom decile of academic preparation were
admitted at a higher rate (6.35%) than the average
across all typical applicants (5.46%).” This race/class
preference violates the equality interests of students
of color and poor whites—all of whom achieve far
more with less. See Jonathan P. Feingold, ‘All (Poor)
Lives Matter’: How Class-Not-Race Logic Reinscribes
Race and Class Privilege, U. Chi. L. Rev. Online 47
(2020).
Were Petitioner intent on remedying alleged
anti-Asian bias, eliminating racial advantages, or
promoting
“meritocracy,”
Harvard’s
Legacy+
preferences would offer the obvious point of legal and
political attack, not RCAPs. The race/class
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preferences embodied within Legacy+ preferences
constitute a naked disregard for “meritocracy” that
harms far more deserving, accomplished, and
perseverant students of color—including many Asian
Americans. See Arcidiacono et al., supra, at 151 (“We
suspect that if we were able to run these
counterfactuals, the share of white admits would drop
by significantly more than 6%, and the share of Asian
American admits would rise by more than 9%.”).
But this litigation was never intended to
remedy negative action or mitigate racial advantages
that white applicants now enjoy. See Br. of Amicus
Curiae Walter Dellinger in Supp. of Def.-Appellee on
the Issue of Standing at 10-11, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard
Coll., 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2005)
(quoting Edward Blum) (“I needed plaintiffs; I needed
Asian
plaintiffs … so
I
started … HarvardNotFair.org.”). To the contrary,
Petitioner aims to undermine the legal and moral case
for affirmative action—even as RCAPs comprise a
modest tool to mitigate the white racial advantages
that harm innocent Asian Americans and other
students of color. Were Petitioner and this Court
concerned about racial equality in admissions, the
remedy would be clear: more affirmative action, not
less.
Critically, even if Harvard and UNC eliminate
all Legacy+ preferences, RCAPs would remain
essential to counter unearned racial advantages that
flow to white applicants. As outlined below, other
“colorblind” components of Respondents’ admissions
processes understate the existing academic talent and
potential of students of color. RCAPs, in turn, offer a
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modest tool to counter the preferential treatment
white applicants would otherwise enjoy—and thereby
promote a more individualized, equitable, and
“meritocratic” admissions process.
2. RCAPs counter racial advantages
that white applicants enjoy in
“colorblind” components of Harvard
and UNC’s admissions processes.
When Justice Powell recognized that RCAPs
could ensure a more “meritocratic” process, he was
not envisioning the need to counter naked deviations
from “merit” like Legacy+ preferences. Rather, he
intuited that RCAPs might be necessary to correct for
standard metrics—e.g., standardized tests—that fail
to capture the true academic talent and potential of
students of color. To borrow his words, Justice Powell
realized that RCAPs might serve a critical
antidiscrimination function by correcting faulty
measures that denied students of color a “fair
appraisal of . . . [their] academic promise.” Bakke, 438
U.S. at 306 n.43
This insight is now buttressed by decades of
empirical scholarship. See Jonathan P. Feingold,
Hidden in Plain Sight: A More Compelling Case for
Diversity, 2019 Utah L. Rev. 59 (2019). Nonetheless,
it remains peripheral to this Court’s affirmative
action jurisprudence. One reason is that universities
have
not
defended
RCAPs
as
essential
antidiscrimination that promotes “meritocracy” by
reducing race’s impact on admissions. As a result, this
Court has not engaged one of the most compelling
legal and normative justifications for RCAPs and
affirmative action writ large. See Feingold, supra,
Ambivalent Advocates.
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At bottom, when universities privilege faulty
measures of student achievement, white students
enjoy an unearned racial advantage that denies
students of color an individualized, “meritocratic,”
and race-neutral review. See Devon W. Carbado,
Footnote 43: Recovering Justice Powell’s AntiPreference Framing of Affirmative Action, 53 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1117 (2019). Two common measures of
“merit” are particularly prone to understate the true
academic abilities of students of color.
First, subjective assessments like interviews
and letters of recommendation can subject applicants
from negatively stereotyped racial groups to
disparate treatment. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision
of Affirmative Action, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1063, 1089
(2006) (“What we thought to be fair assessments of
‘merit’ can turn out to be mismeasurements—not
because of explicit animus but because of hidden
mental processes … ”).
Second, standardized tests and grades tend to
understate the existing academic abilities of Black
and Latinx students. See Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal
Protection Design Defects, 91 Temple L. Rev. 513
(2019).
a. Due to implicit biases, subjective
assessments can systematically
understate the existing “merit” of
students of color.
Implicit biases refer to stereotypes or attitudes
people hold about social categories (e.g., race, gender,
age) but cannot identify through earnest selfintrospection. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in
the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1126 (2012).
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Decades of research confirm that implicit biases are
pervasive; tend to favor majority groups over minority
groups; are often more severe than explicit biases;
and affect behavior and decision-making across
domains. See id. At least one state supreme court has
taken judicial notice of implicit biases’ prevalence and
impact. See State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 635 (Wash.
2018) (“Given the evidence before this court and our
judicial notice of implicit and overt racial bias against
black defendants in this state, we are confident that
the association between race and the death penalty is
not attributed to random chance.”).
Racial stereotypes render all students of color
vulnerable to implicit biases before, during, and after
admissions. During admissions, implicit biases are
most likely to compromise the reliability of subjective
assessments that grant evaluators wide discretion.
See Kang et al., supra, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom
at 1142 (“[T]he conditions under which implicit biases
translate most readily into discriminatory behavior
are when people have wide discretion in making quick
decisions with little accountability.”) This includes
alumni
interviews
and
guidance
counselor
recommendations, among other assessments like
Harvard’s “personal” rating.
On this point, the district court found it
“possible … that part of the statistical disparity
resulted from admissions officers’ implicit biases that
disadvantaged Asian American applicants in the
personal rating relative to white applicants….” See
SFFA v. Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 171; see also
Plaintiff’s MSJ at 10 (“If Asian-American applicants
were treated like white applicants, their chances of
receiving a 2 or better on the personal rating would
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increase by 21%.”). The district court could not
identify the source of alleged anti-Asian bias with
absolute certainty. Even so, its statement reinforces a
key insight: negative action against Asian
Americans—whether traceable to implicit biases
(that affect subjective assessments), explicit
preferences (that underlie Legacy+ preferences), or
elsewhere—derives from “colorblind” considerations
that benefit white applicants.
Were there any doubt that the alleged antiAsian bias benefits white applicants, Petitioner
makes clear that “even taking ‘Harvard’s scoring of
applicants at face value, Harvard imposes a penalty
against Asian Americans as compared to whites’ that
‘has a significant effect on an Asian-American
applicant’s probability of admission.’” Plaintiff’s MSJ
at 10; see also id. (“An Asian-American male applicant
with a 25% chance of admission would see his chance
increase to 31.7% if he were white—even including
the biased personal rating.”).
For decades, stakeholders have raised concerns
that racial stereotypes harm students of color—
including Asian American university applicants. See
Vinay
Harpalani, Asian
Americans,
Racial
Stereotypes, supra, 102 B.U. L. Rev. at 267-73. In
1990, for example, OCR found that UCLA had
discriminated against several Asian American
applicants and ordered them to be admitted. Id. at
272. Although this history does not implicate
Respondents, it resonates with the concern that
subjective assessments like Harvard’s “personal”
rating, guidance counselor recommendations, and
alumni interviews are susceptible to implicit biases.
These measures are prone to systematically
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understate the qualifications and accomplishments of
not only Asian Americans, but also Black, Latinx, and
Native American applicants.
Absent intervention, unmindful reliance on
such measures inflates the relative “merit” of
similarly situated white applicants. RCAPs offer one
modest countermeasure that mitigates this unearned
white racial advantage. If anything, Petitioner’s
evidence suggests that Harvard’s RCAP is
insufficient. A proper remedy would entail a
recalibrated RCAP better tailored to mitigate implicit
biases that harm Asian Americans and other students
of color.
b. Due to stereotype threat,
standardized tests and grades tend
to understate the existing “merit” of
Black and Latinx students.
Standardized
tests
and
grades
often
understate the actual academic abilities of students
from groups stereotyped as intellectually inferior. See
Gregory M. Walton & Steven J. Spencer, Latent
Ability: Grades and Test Scores Systematically
Underestimate the Intellectual Ability of Negatively
Stereotyped Students, 20 Psych. Sci. 1132 (2009).
A significant portion of this measurement error
derives from stereotype threat, one of the most studied
psychological phenomena of the past three decades.
Stereotype threat refers to the psychological threat
that arises when students fear poor performance on
an academic task could confirm negative stereotypes
about their group. See Claude M. Steele, Whistling
Vivaldi: How Stereotypes Affect Us and What We Can
Do (Norton, 2010). When stereotype threat arises, it
creates a cognitive “tax” that interferes with academic
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performance. Id. As a result, a portion of perceived
racial “achievement gaps” are illusory, a reflection of
psychological harms not actual differences in
preparation, ability, or potential.
Stereotype threat is most likely to affect the
highest achieving Black and Latinx students. See id.
(observing that stereotype threat has the largest
effect on a group’s vanguard). Multiple meta-analyses
have concluded that grades and test scores can
understate the existing ability of affected students by
an average of .18 standard deviations. See Walton &
Spencer, supra, Latent Ability. This translates to
roughly 63 points on the SAT. See Br. of Experimental
Psychs. as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Resp’t at 18-19,
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198
(2016) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6774020 [hereinafter
“Experimental Psychologists’ Br.”]
In Fisher, leading stereotype threat scholars
identified “three important implications” from the
research. See id. at 5-6.
First, because stereotype threat depresses the
true academic abilities of Black and Latinx students,
“[a] genuine merit-based admission policy . . . cannot
rely on th[o]se numbers alone.” Admissions policies
that account for stereotype threat—e.g., by
considering applicant race—are “not a departure from
merit-based admissions” but rather offer “more
accurate merit-based admissions.” Id. at 5.
Second, stereotype threat depresses the grades
of negatively stereotyped students in college. Id.
Accordingly, when universities do not mitigate
stereotype threat (in admissions or thereafter), the
institution compromises the present and personal
equality rights of individual students of color. See
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Jonathan P. Feingold, Hidden in Plain Sight, supra,
2019 Utah L. Rev. 59. One way to reduce stereotype
threat—and thereby promote equality on campus—is
to admit racially diverse student bodies. Id. at 106114.
Third, when stereotype threat is reduced,
students from negatively stereotyped groups “show
dramatic
improvements
in
performance.”
Experimental Psychologists’ Br. at 6.
To summarize, when universities privilege
grades and standardized test scores, they are
privileging metrics that under-state the true
academic talent and potential of students of color.
This creates an undeserved racial bonus for white
applicants. RCAPs, in turn, offer one mechanism to
mitigate this site of white racial advantage. This is
not a story about affirmative action redressing some
past harm or remedying “societal discrimination”
exogenous to the university. To the contrary, by
considering race, Respondents can correct for metrics
that artificially inflate the relative “merit” of white
applicants. The result is a more accurate and
“meritocratic” process that yields greater student
body diversity—all of which protects the present and
personal equality interests of students of color during
admissions and thereafter.
The foregoing reflects the scenario Justice
Powell envisioned in Bakke. Respondents RCAPs
ensure a more “fair appraisal of each individual’s
academic promise” because they “cur[e] established
inaccuracies in predicting academic performance.”
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43. Respondents RCAPs
constitute “no ‘preference’ at all.” Id.
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C. Justice Powell’s insight suggests that
strict scrutiny is inappropriate when
RCAPs
reduce
white
racial
advantages.
The record confirms that Respondents’ RCAPs,
because they serve an essential antidiscrimination
function, satisfy strict scrutiny. But once one
recognizes how RCAPs ensure a more racially
neutral, individualized and “meritocratic” admissions
process, it calls into question this Court’s conclusion
that strict scrutiny is appropriate for all “racial
classifications.” This standard constitutionalizes an
equivalence between the race-conscious practices that
entrenched American apartheid (e.g., Jim Crow) and
race-conscious efforts to undo that ignoble legacy
(e.g., affirmative action). The irony should be obvious.
Consequently, this Court should hold that
strict scrutiny is inappropriate for RCAPs designed to
diversify and desegregate historically white
institutions by countering racial advantages for white
applicants. Such a standard would realign this
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence with Brown’s
animating spirit and legal mandate.
To this end, all parties agree that race and
racism remain central organizing forces in America.
See Pet’r’s Br. 49 (“No one is under the illusion that
we live in a postracial society, or that racial
discrimination is a thing of the past.”). This Court,
likewise, has long acknowledged that while “race
should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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Nonetheless, this Court continues to subject all
RCAPs to strict scrutiny. On the one hand, the Court
recognizes racism’s indelible impact on society. On
the other hand, the Court views with skepticism raceconscious endeavors to mitigate that reality. This
dissonance has always been palpable. If race matters
outside of admissions, race matters inside of
admissions—whether we like it or not. And unless
universities account for race and racism, they will
privilege students who enjoy the most inherited racial
advantage. Against this backdrop, “the application of
strict scrutiny to affirmative action [becomes]
normatively and doctrinally suspect.” See Carbado,
supra, Footnote 43 at 1123.
Only by considering race can Respondents
move us closer to a society in which race no longer
matters. Respondents’ RCAPs offer a modest
corrective to existing racial advantages for white
applicants. They accordingly ensure a more “fair
appraisal” of each applicant’s existing academic
“merit.” And in the process, they desegregate and
diversify historically white universities.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgments
below should be affirmed.
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